



Geostrategic infiltration in UN peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa: Stakes in the consolidation of the UN peacekeeping mandates (Case of ONUC in DRC in 1960)

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ABSTRACT: *This study focuses on the deployments of UN peacekeeping operations within intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. The statement of the problem and objective of the study is to demonstrate that amidst the significant roles that UN peacekeeping operations deployed within intra-state armed conflicts in Africa have played and are still playing, nonetheless growing geostrategic infiltration from hegemonic states as well as other member states from where troops are drawn from to constitute different operations have to be mitigated. This is very important for a successful consolidation of the mandates of different UN peacekeeping operations deployed within intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. The study makes use of both secondary and most importantly empirical data obtained from experts. The research method that fits the study incorporated by the author is the qualitative research method alongside its instruments. The results of the findings were parallel to the problem statement raised which of course proves that geostrategic infiltration aimed at guaranteeing the interests of hegemonic and other member states of the UN are apparent. The conclusion of the study and recommendations were proffered to mitigating geostrategic infiltration in UN peacekeeping deployments faced with intra-state armed conflicts in Africa after an in-depth analysis of the case study under review in this study. That is, the United Nations Operations in the Congo deployed in view of the intra-state armed conflict that hits Congo in 1960 ended a debacle. A debacle explained largely by geostrategic infiltration. Of course the Security Council is making every effort to mitigate the numerous challenges that have and are still impeding the UN peacekeeping operations from successfully consolidating their mandates in different intra-state armed conflicts in Africa where they have been deployed. This study therefore seeks to draw the attention of the international community to a veritable challenge which has become a pertinent stake (geostrategic infiltration) impeding the successful consolidation of the different UN peacekeeping mandates deployed within intra-state armed conflicts in Africa.*

Keywords: *geostrategic, infiltration, peacekeeping operations, stakes, mandate*

INTRODUCTION

Conflict among organized human groups is as old as the human society itself. UN peacekeeping missions enjoy growing popularity as the international community's tool of choice for conflict containment in different parts of the world (R.E Utley, 2006, p. 103). The UN is embodied by distinctive organs and the organ that champions the putting in place of the peacekeeping mission is the Security Council (SC). The Security Council is involved primarily with political issues among states and to be more concise conflict related issues which could either be inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts. The Security Council is comprised of five permanent members who have the veto rights. The Security Council also has ten non-permanent members who do not have the veto rights over procedural and substantive decisions. The five permanent members thought it wise to install peacekeeping operations that could be deployed in the eventuality of armed conflicts among and within states. This was indeed a very brilliant idea given that at that time just as it is now, the UN does not have a standby army of its own that could be deployed immediately in the event of an armed conflict. Most importantly, the failure of the concept of collective security made the creation of the peacekeeping inevitable. Consequently, these two major setbacks accelerated the birth of the peacekeeping operations (Abi-Saab, Georges, 1995, pp. 11-38).

Since the inception of the UN peacekeeping operations, there has been a series of evolution of peacekeeping from the first generation peacekeeping, second generation peacekeeping and the third generation peacekeeping that took effect from 1993. Some scholars are even switching to a fourth generation peacekeeping. The first and second peacekeeping generations were attached to chapter VI of the UN charter based on three doctrinal principles. They include inter alia: the consent of the parties in conflict; impartiality; and the non-recourse to force except in the case of legitimate self-defense to defend their mandates. However, with the advent of the 1990's that came with the collapse of the adversarial decades of the Cold War, there was a conspicuous mutation of armed conflicts that came with a tremendous decline of inter-state armed conflicts to the unprecedented upsurge in intra-state armed conflicts (Malan, Mark, 1998, pp. 9-31). Apart from the first, second, and third peacekeeping generations highlighted above, a fourth generation peacekeeping emerged distinct from the first, second, and third peacekeeping. This was articulated under the framework of chapter VII of the UN charter coined "peace enforcement." In fact, this fourth generation peacekeeping is based on the use of force violating the consent of the protagonists and/or parties in conflict for humanitarian reasons which must be backed up with authorization from the Security Council. Although enforcement is inscribed in the Charter, it is costly both in terms of money and lives. And while the numbers of UN peacekeeping operations have exploded in recent years, many countries are unwilling to pay the bill or send troops to a zone of conflict (Collins, C.J, 1993, pp. 23-44). The setting up of the UN peacekeeping mission decades ago as the international community's tool to maintaining international peace and security in conflict ridden spots across the globe was indeed a lauded initiative. Unfortunately, the continent of Africa is experiencing an exponential rate of failure of the UN peacekeeping operations in consolidating their mandates faced with the upsurge of intra-state armed conflicts where they are deployed. This of course again makes thinking inevitable in the direction of whether the theoretically developed peacekeeping mandates are

followed by the same spirit by the peacekeepers faced with the implementation of the mandates on the field. In other words, the question that arises goes thus: are the field operations not a mere façade as geostrategic infiltration from hegemonic powers and other member States from where troops are drawn from appears to have overtaken the rules of engagement to all the troops which is holistically directed towards the consolidation of the different mandates? In other words, making all efforts towards combatting challenges under normal circumstances like; inadequate finances, inadequate troops, inchoate mandate, belated intervention, inadequate logistics which equally act as stakes impeding the successful consolidation of the desperate mandates of UN peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa, nonetheless, geostrategic infiltration of hegemonic and other member states appears preponderant.

1. Background and Justification to the Study

In view of the exponential increase in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa especially during the post-Cold War decade alongside the inability of host governments and non-state armed groups to arrive at a pacific consensus towards bringing these heinous conflicts to peaceful end, made these conflicts to constitute threats to international peace and security. This has given way for the deployments of the UN peacekeeping missions to finding veritable solutions towards charting the path to peace and serenity among the belligerents in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. The United Nations Organizations being an international world body with over 193 member states has a universal mission which is to maintain international peace and security among and within member states. To achieve this fundamental objective the peacekeeping mission was established to be deployed in conflict ridden spots across the globe. The role of the UN peacekeepers is supposed to be proportionately equitable, universal as well as altruistic to saving the lives of the vulnerable populations in conflict stricken zones. Moreover, the role should as well be able to explore all possible means of reconciling the protagonists for the reconstitution of peace and stability in all continents. However, when we critically look at the UN peacekeeping deployments in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa from the earliest deployment in the 1960 to several others during the post-Cold War decade and consequently those of the 21st Century, we find every reason to ask. And that pertinent question to ask is if at all the UN peacekeeping deployments in Africa match with the altruistically constructed mandates faced with intra-state armed conflicts, or are the deployments of the UN peacekeepers faced with intra-state armed conflicts in Africa not heavily influenced by geostrategic infiltration? That is, are UN peacekeeping deployments in Africa not a vehicle behind which the five permanent members (P-5) in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as well as other member States passed through to entrench their geo-strategic agendas through taking advantage of intra-state armed conflicts in Africa? It is rational to think this way giving that almost all the UN peacekeeping deployments in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa are characterized by failure with their mandates hardly being consolidated successfully.

The role of the UN peacekeepers is supposed to be proportionately equitable and universal. Unfortunately, geostrategic considerations over saving the lives of the vulnerable populations in conflict stricken zones in Africa where the peacekeepers are deployed, appears to be dominating the veritable raison d'être for creating the UN peacekeeping operations by the Security Council (Dena Taylor, 2019, pp. 18-21). However, when we critically

look at the UN peacekeeping deployments in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa from the earliest deployment in the 1960 to several others during the post-Cold War decade, and consequently the latest ones in the 21st Century in Africa, we find every reason to ask. And that pertinent question to ask is if at all the UN peacekeeping deployments are solely anchored on exploring every possibility to successfully consolidate their mandates and evict the war torn settings or are the deployments rather overtaken by geostrategic consideration as their undercurrent? In other words, the geography of African countries and its endowments in terms of natural and mineral resources have become a principal bone of contention to hegemonic states and other member states from where troops are drawn and deployed to intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. This is vehicle via UN peacekeeping operations far more than under bilateral and multilateral foreign policy relations among states. And though the theoretical mandates drafted by the Security Council reflect every genuineness of the UN peacekeeping missions, nonetheless among several challenges confronted by the UN peacekeeping operations to successfully consolidate their mandates in zones of intra-state armed conflicts in Africa, geostrategic infiltration has been incorporated resulting to the gross fiasco UN peacekeeping operations following their deployments in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa.

There is no universally binding consensus as regards the definition of peacekeeping mission. Thus this makes the concept a nebulous one. However, various definitions propounded by different organizations and scientific authors as to the definition of the concept could be held on. According to the UN Document (1992) an Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31st January 1992, 17 June 1992. This document defines the UN peacekeeping operation as, “the deployment of the United Nations’ presence on the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both prevention of conflict and the making of peace” (B. Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para. 20).

FT Lui defines UN peacekeeping as: essentially a practical mechanism used by the UN to contain international conflicts and facilitate their settlements by peaceful means (Levine, D.H, 2001, pp. 422-450)

According to the Charter of the United Nations (1945) the Security Council is invested with the principal responsibility to maintain international peace and security. In exercising this responsibility, this organ decided to put in place peacekeeping operations. Each peacekeeping operation of the UN is created and deployed on the basis of specific mandates defined by the Security Council. A mandate is an official authorization that allows for the deployment of the UN peacekeeping operation, carrying the details of the precise tasks which the peacekeepers have to fulfill in the deployed zones of armed conflicts. The mandates vary depending on the situation, nature of the conflict and the particular challenges presented. Furthermore, the mandates are influenced vis-à-vis the nature and the content of the accord concluded between the protagonists in conflict.

Grosso modo, according to their mandates the peacekeepers are called for the following purposes:

1. To prevent the start of a conflict or stop a conflict from escalating beyond the frontiers.
2. Stabilize the situation of conflict after a cease-fire and at the end create a suitable environment for the disputants to reach an accord of durable peace.
3. Assist in putting to work the global accords of peace.
4. Accompany the states or the territories during the transition towards a stable government based on democratic principles inter alia; good governance, respect of rule of law, respect of human rights and economic development.
5. Ensure Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ancien combattants (DDR).
6. Strengthen the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and other activities aimed at restoring the state of law.
7. Protect and promote human rights.
8. Surveillance in elections.

The mandate that the Security Council confers to the peacekeeping will reflect one of the aforementioned points outlined. Furthermore, in as much as the Security Council has to create and deploy the peacekeeping mission in maintenance of international peace and security in war-torn countries, the creation of the peacekeeping missions has to respect the following criteria fixed by the UNSC:

1. The existence of the situation must be one that poses danger or rather constitute a threat to international peace and security.
2. If the sub-regional and regional arrangements exist and are ready to aid the regulation of the situation as well as the measures to be taking.
3. If a cease-fire is in full force and if the parties are committed in the peace process.
4. If the political objective is clearly defined and if it finds its expression in the mandate.
5. If a precise mandate may be formulated for the operation of the UN.
6. If the security of the UN personnel may be assured and that the factions have guaranteed the security of the UN personnel (Théophile Owona, 2014, pp. 33-49)

From the above analysis on the purposes for which the peacekeeping operations are created, deployed and the criteria under which they are deployed, it becomes apparent that the Security Council has to aside from ensuring that the elements that constitute the mandate and the criteria are intact, need also to give consideration on the geostrategic context of Africa. This is because the geostrategic context of Africa has influenced hegemonic states and other member States away from the rules of engagement and the altruistic character of the operations which are to consolidate the mandates and ensure for peace and stability in conflict hot spots in Africa. Instead, we see the preponderance of the realist traits among the peacekeeping contingents as well as the hegemonic powers overshadowing the veritable intent of the deployments of UN peacekeeping operations. This has further compounded the situation in conflict hot spots in Africa through the lost of human lives, properties, increased humanitarian crises resulting to unprecedented internally displaced persons within and refugees seeking safe

haven in neighbouring countries without. In the subsequent sub themes below, we will be zooming through an intra-state armed conflict in the 20th Century to demonstrate how geostrategic infiltration appeared a major impediment to the successful consolidation of the UN peacekeeping operation deployed in that 20th Century intra-state armed conflict in Africa. That was in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) following the outbreak of the Congolese civil war in 1960 where the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was deployed.

The study shall be partitioned in this chronology; statement of the problem, objective, results and discussions and lastly conclusion and recommendation. The qualitative method of research was adopted in this study with both the primary and secondary sources of data integrated.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The intent for which the UN was set up with an obligatory responsibility to maintain international peace and security among member states is to a greater extent being usurped. This is spearheaded particularly by the US and her Western allies for their distinctive geostrategic interests through creating and deploying peacekeeping. And these peacekeepers are deployed with uncommitted roles which are influenced by rather geostrategic considerations at the expense of human lives particular when it comes to Africa. The UN gives the world community the impression that it is a genuine world body aimed at arresting intra-state armed conflicts that could threaten international peace and security through ensuring the human security of the population in war-torn zones. Unfortunately the veritable role of maintaining international peace and security through creating and deploying peacekeeping missions is a facade as the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) are not influenced by the moral compulsion to do good. However most likely, they are rather being influenced by geostrategic considerations that point largely to their individual geo-strategic and economic interests to grasp in war-torn settings instead to focus on the consolidation of their mandates for the preservation of human lives. This has been exaggerated following UN peacekeeping deployments in Africa (Diamond, J, 2005, p. 36). Some authors even wonder if really the P-5 in the UNSC valued African lives. It is against this backdrop that this study on this topic to analyze how geostrategic infiltration is considered a serious stake in the successful consolidation of the mandates of the UN peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa with the specific case study under review being the intra-state armed conflict that hits the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1960. The African, Asian and the pacific continents which are all in the southern hemisphere top the chart with an increasing rate of intra-state armed conflicts. The height of the upsurge in intra-state armed conflicts became exponential during the post-Cold War decade with an unprecedented increase in countries in the global south especially countries in Africa, Asia and the pacific (De Waal, A, 2005, pp. 51-56)

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The objective of this study is to investigate the penetration of geostrategic infiltration in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa deployed in intra-state armed conflicts with particular attention on a 20th Century UN peacekeeping operation ONUC deployed in the intra-state armed conflict that hits the Democratic Republic of the

Congo in 1960. With the increasing occurrence of intra-state armed conflicts in the early nineties, the continents of Africa, Asia and the Pacific are topping the chart as illustrated in the figure below (1990-1999). Therefore in a nutshell, the objectives of this study include: to investigate analytically the penetration of geostrategic considerations in UN peacekeeping deployments in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa; and the second objective is to demonstrate how geostrategic infiltration constitute a grave stake in the successful consolidation of the UN peacekeeping mandates deployed in intra-state armed conflict in Africa with the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo being the major case study under review in this study.

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Region	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Asia & Pacific	21	21	25	24	23	21	22	24	19	20
Central & South America	7	6	5	3	4	5	4	3	3	2
North Africa & Middle East	7	8	8	9	9	9	8	8	6	4
Sub-Saharan Africa	17	22	18	18	23	21	18	19	18	16
Europe	4	10	12	8	6	4	2	3	3	5
Total	56	67	68	62	65	60	54	57	49	47

Source: <http://www.berghof-handbook.net>

1. Geostrategic infiltration into the UN peacekeeping operations deployed in Africa

The geostrategic position of African countries, the natural and mineral resources endowed therein are veritable undercurrent that have influenced not only hegemonic states but also the different member states from where troops are drawn to constitute the UN peacekeeping operations. This influence has in no small way contributed adversely towards the successful consolidation of the UN peacekeeping mandates in the deployed zones of intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. While UN peacekeeping operations have scored a certain proportion of success in

other continents, UN peacekeeping deployments in Africa have been characterized a debacle. Though it is unarguable that there are challenges which have been accounted for the failure of the UN peacekeeping operations to successfully consolidate their mandates like; inadequate funding, inadequate and lack of trained troops, inadequate logistics, belated intervention, inchoate mandates and to mentioned only but these few, nonetheless the above mentioned challenges could be ranked secondary as the geostrategic and economic interests of hegemonic and other member states appear primary. Geostrategic and economic entrenchment of hegemonic powers and other member states instigated due to the rich sub-soil of the African countries as well as the position which is most strategic seems to constitute a veritable stake behind the unsuccessful consolidation of UN peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa.

The preponderant influence of the geostrategic positioning of Africa and its overwhelming influence towards the unsuccessful consolidation of the UN peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa cannot be underestimated. One of the intra-state armed conflicts drawn from the 20th will be reviewed analytically in order to demonstrate how geostrategic stake contributed extensively towards the unsuccessful consolidation of the mandate of the peacekeepers in that country. That is, the United Nations Operation in the Congo in 1960.

In light with the topic under review in this study, the theory of organized hypocrisy could be thought of. The theory of organized hypocrisy is not very common among many scholars hence the political and diplomatic dynamics associated with this concept are little known to students and practitioners of global politics and diplomacy. These dynamics have direct implications on the conduct of UN peacekeeping missions and global governance. According to Lipson (2007) organized hypocrisy is a phenomenon espoused by organizational behaviour theorists to explain how organizations respond to conflicting and challenging pressures emanating from external environments through adoption of contradictory actions and statements in order to deliberately mislead the public. In the same trajectory, organized hypocrisy is manifested by inconsistencies and contradictions between publicly pronounced organizational expressions and aspirations to respect norms such as state sovereignty yet in real practice, these norms are violated. Krasner (1999) argued that organized hypocrisy explains the enduring and routine violation to veritable roles of the UN peacekeepers faced with the consolidation of their mandates in situations of intra-state armed conflicts in Africa.

Brunsson (1989) one of the leading theorists on organized hypocrisy argued that organized hypocrisy refers to organizational responses to “conflicting logics of consequences and appropriateness.” It also refers to parallel structures that are set by organizations as what happened during UN peacekeeping operations in Congo during the early 1960s. This occurred when Secretary General Hammarskjold established a secretive cabinet of American special advisers and himself known as the “Congo Club” to run the affairs of the UN peacekeeping mission whose aim was to entrench US hegemony in Africa after dislodging Belgian post-colonial influence in that country. Brunsson concluded that “organized hypocrisy is a fundamental type of behaviour” in most political organizations such as the UN.

2. Geostrategic infiltration-stake in the consolidation of ONUC's mandate in DRC

The Democratic Republic of the Congo placed within a geostrategic positioning, makes it very pertinent to examine the stake in the consolidation of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in the Congo explained largely beyond endogenous limitations but largely due to the infiltration of geostrategic consideration. Congo, in its early years of independence (1960-1964) failed to offer its own citizens peace and security despite the deployment of UN peacekeepers in the country. This was fostered through the manipulation of the internal political power dynamics in Congo by some senior UN officials in violation of Congo's autonomy. This automatically resulted in the mission's failing to accomplish desired objectives of bringing about durable peace and security in the Congo. The UN peacekeeping mission in Congo ONUC served as a proxy force to legitimize a regime change agenda that culminated in the installation of a pro-Western government that did not serve the interests of the Congolese population ((Al-Qaq, 2009, p. 71). The United Nations Operation in the Congo ONUC was originally deployed to preserve the autonomy of the country following Belgian military intervention. It succeeded in securing the withdrawal of the invading Belgian forces and it also succeeded in reversing the disintegration of Congo into fiefdoms. However, it dismally failed to restore the nascent democracy in Congo and equally failed to bring about long term self-determination, political and economic stability in the host country (Collins, C.J, 1993, pp. 81-86).

Firstly, according to Al Qaq (2009) ONUC was by far the largest peacekeeping mission to be deployed during the Cold War period and it was the first mission to have non-military members tasked with the responsibility of rebuilding and administering key aspects of a host country's public institutions inclusive of security sector reform, activities that interfered with the autonomy of Congo. Moreover, it was the first UN peacekeeping mission to be authorized to use force to facilitate the execution of its mandate (Al-Qaq, 2009, p. 83). Secondly, the mission was the most advanced and sophisticated experiment in international cooperation ever attempted by the world. Thirdly, ONUC was the most complex and most controversial mission because it violated all the rules and principles of peacekeeping especially the "holy trinity" of UN peacekeeping namely: consent of host nation, impartiality and non-use of force except in legitimate self-defence that applied to previous peacekeeping missions. Fourthly, ONUC served as a "watershed" peacekeeping operation in UN interference in internal affairs of an autonomous member state in violation of the UN Charter (Abi-Saab, G 1978, pp. 17-18). ONUC overwhelmingly demonstrated the extent to which the UN through its Secretary General and his advisers, could determine the course of political events in the host country without paying due attention to the wishes, interests and aspirations of citizens of the host nation. Considering its size, cost and controversy in mandate interpretation, ONUC was a precursor to the peacekeeping missions that were to be undertaken by the world body in the post-Cold War era hence it was indeed "a watershed in the development of international peacekeeping" (James, A, 1996, p. 25)

On 12 July 1960 President Kasa Vubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba jointly sent an appeal to the UN Secretary General urgently requesting for military assistance to deal with the invading Belgian forces. The Congolese appeal was very succinct and unambiguous as it stated that, "The purpose of the requested military aid was to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which was a threat to

international peace” (UN Doc, 1960). President Kasa Vubu and Prime Minister Lumumba jointly dispatched another cable to the Secretary General correcting the erroneous message sent earlier by their three ministers while they were out of the capital Leopoldville. According to UN Doc (1960) the follow up message to the UN by the central government was meant to further clarify and elaborate the exact nature of the urgent request in order to remove any ambiguities. Essential aspects of the message were as follows:

...(1) the purpose of the aid requested is not to restore the internal situation in Congo but rather to protect the national territory against acts of aggression posed by Belgian metropolitan troops. (2) The request for assistance relates only to a UN force consisting of military personnel of neutral countries and not of US as reported by certain radio stations. (3) If requested assistance is not received without delay the Republic of the Congo will be obliged to appeal to the Bandung Treaty Powers. (4) The aid has been requested by the Republic of the Congo in the exercise of its sovereign rights and not in agreement with Belgium as reported.

It is crystal clear that the Congolese central government wanted military assistance to effectively engage the invading Belgian troops and ensure their withdrawal from Congo as a precondition for the restoration of status quo ante. Considering that the US had declined a request for military assistance from the same Congolese government, the legitimate government of Congo sought to cast their net wider by approaching the Soviet Union for military assistance in the event that there was no speedy response from the UN to their request for military assistance. We could from this point ascertain that ONUC’s deployment in DRC could not have been instigated by veritable roles aimed at addressing the root causes of the conflict through treating the unambiguous message sent by the legitimate government of the Congo but rather geostrategic entrenchment of economic interests far from primarily addressing the root causes of the conflict-but much more to install the cynical interests of the western powers and the US against a legitimate autonomous government. As stated in the speech of the Congolese President and Prime Minister, recognized legitimate authorities in the Congo seeking for assistance from an international body having as overall objective to maintain international peace and security, the UN was supposed to have respected the exact context under which the Congolese government was requesting for its intervention. However, other geo-strategic and economic interests of the US and her Western allies over the DRC alternated all of that. Thus, this accounted for the unsuccessful consolidation of its mandate.

Similarly, Hoskyns (1961) observed that the two Congolese leaders concurrently dispatched a cable to the Soviet leader requesting him to be on standby while closely monitoring the developments in the Congo. The request for Soviet assistance was sent on 14th July, the day the Security Council authorized the deployment of ONUC through Security Council Resolution 145 dated 14 June 1960 (Higgins, R, 1980, pp. 68-72). Abi-Saab (1978) is of the view that the request made to the Soviet Union was probably an initiative “Conceived as a lever inciting the UN and the Western powers to exert pressure on Belgium to withdraw.” This view cannot be substantiated. However, it is important to note that it was well within the powers of the Congolese leadership to invite international assistance to bolster the country’s self-defense when faced by foreign military aggression. Equally, it cannot be ruled out that the invitation extended to the Soviet Union was a desperate attempt at influencing the Western powers to speedily influence their NATO counterpart (Belgium) to withdraw from Congo. ONUC officials sadly interpreted the initiative differently as they believed this was enough proof that

Lumumba was pro-Soviet and that he wanted to set the two super powers against each other, a development they resolved to thwart at all costs. The viewing of Lumumba as a pro-Soviet revolutionary significantly influenced the decision making process of the Secretary General and his close advisers that were predominantly American citizens (O'Brien, C, 1962, p. 84). Grovogui (2002) argues that the US, Belgium and their Western allies wanted to preserve their access to Congo's strategic and rare minerals and other natural resources to offset Soviet advantages in access to raw materials. Thus the need to explicitly reverse the unilateral intervention by Belgian troops, the fear of Soviet involvement in Congo, and the determination to deny the Soviets access to strategic minerals as well as depriving them any pretext for unilateral or covert involvement in the Congo influenced the deployment of ONUC. Thus, the purpose of deploying UN peacekeepers was therefore not necessarily based on veritably consolidating the mandate which was to assist the Congolese re-assert their independence and autonomy as requested by the central government following external aggression by Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries. Similarly, it was rather geostrategic considerations which are to facilitate the smooth withdrawal of Belgian metropolitan troops that were to be replaced by peacekeepers that had come to guarantee the safety of the Congolese white population and other foreigners (Collins, C, 1992, pp. 5-22)

The full strategic implications of deploying peacekeepers in Congo were not apparent to the Soviet Union that voted in favour of the deployment in Congo while Britain and France abstained. Moreover, James (1996) is of the view that the idea of deploying UN peacekeepers in Congo was widely embraced "although its implications were less than fully understood" by the majority of nations that believed such missions were meant to truly address international crises in an impartial manner. Taking advantage of the wisdom of hind sight, it is now apparent that the Secretary General and his American dominated advisory team had sinister and malicious strategic designs to ensure that Western interests were preserved and promoted at the expense of the well-being of the Congolese population and government as long as Western interests, particularly American interests were safeguarded. The Congolese initial request for "technical assistance" from the UN was with a view "To reorganizing and retraining the Congolese National Army" as a component of security sector reform that was meant to be part of the larger scheme of peace-building measures advocated by the Secretary General (Urquhart, B, 1987, pp. 174-181)

Important to note is that the Congolese Government's appeal for UN assistance came after the US had declined a similar request from three Cabinet Ministers namely: Gizenga, Bamboko and Nyembo (1961) at a time when the President and the Prime Minister were away touring the country. The US advised the Congolese authorities to approach the UN for assistance as they publicly declared that it was "undesirable" for any country to unilaterally come to the aid of Congo (Higgins, R 1980, p. 264).

Ball (1961) argues that on receipt of the Congolese request for military assistance, the US considered three options for their response namely: to do nothing; it could agree to the Congolese request for American troops, or it could encourage the Congolese to approach the UN. As a result, the US authorities were afraid that the Soviets would influence the Congolese leadership towards adopting communism a "Form of chaos to communism syndrome." As such, the US opted to use the UN peacekeepers as an "umbrella" for its anti-communist policy in Congo that would achieve desired results at a far less cost compared to direct military involvement. The American

strategic interests in Africa were driven by a desire to secure valuable natural resources and political influence that would guarantee the longevity of America's capitalist system, Military Industrial Complex (MIC), and global economic superiority while denying the same to the Soviet Union (Housen, R.T, 2002, p. 35).

It is therefore apparent that the Americans suggested the channeling of the Congolese Government request to the UN because of two reasons. Firstly, they wanted to keep the Soviets out of the Central African region hence they ensured that the Soviets would not have any plausible pretext for unilateral intervention in Congo once international peacekeepers were in the country performing their tasks. Secondly, the US knew fully well that American national strategic interests would be safeguarded by the American dominated UN peacekeeping political structure without its direct involvement. This view is supported by the composition of the UN Security Council in 1960 when Taiwan held the Chinese seat in the Security Council and the domination of the General Assembly by the pro-Western Latin American countries.

The Weissman (1974) observed that during the early 1960s, the UN acted as a satisfactory vehicle for the promotion of American policy through its domination of key and strategic organs of the world body. In the Security Council the West had four out of five permanent seats with the power of veto (Taiwan represented China) and three out of six of the elected seats. In the General Assembly, the Western and Latin American states only needed 12 Afro-Asian votes to secure the two-thirds majority. A high percentage of staff that manned the Secretariat was basically Western in orientation and outlook in a situation where Americans, British and French staff members held 49 of the 102 senior appointments (ibid). Weissman highlights the fact that the closest advisors to the Secretary General Hammarskjold were all Americans namely: Ralph Bunche under Secretary for Special Political Affairs; Andrew the Executive Assistant; and Heinz Wieschoff Bunche's deputy and the Secretariat's African expert (Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P.D. and Griffin, S, 2010, p. 87). This point is critical in that critical strategic decisions made regarding ONUC were handled by the Secretary General and his close American advisers.

During the early 1960s before most colonies attained independence, the UN membership had a predominantly pro-Western bias. Added to this scenario was the fact that the Secretary General had an American dominated advisory team for peacekeeping in Congo. It is therefore prudent to conclude that the drafting of the mandate and controversial interpretation of Security Council resolutions on the Congo crisis were influenced by geostrategic pro-Western bias of critical institutions of the UN to the detriment of the Congolese people and Government thereby rendering the Congolese Government ineffective and incapable to serve the interests of its citizens.

3. More evidences of geostrategic influence at the core of the deployment of pro-western troops and US civilians in Congo


In the words of Brigadier General Pumzile James Mackakaire of Zimbabwean nationality, he said, "You do find veritable conduct by deployed contingents and individual peacekeepers. The respondent further continued to say however that in the geopolitical environment veritable role is far fetch as there are strategic national interests that each state strives to protect. He went further to say that power dynamics also influence the outcomes. He said it is the one who has the power or money who calls the shot. He compared this with the law by saying that the law

is put in place to protect the powerful where the less powerful suffers despite the fact that the issue at stake that triggers legal intervention speaks in favour of the less powerful. However, because the other party is powerful, that party ends up the winner because the party has financial and political powers thus distorting the character of the law. The respondent affirmed that the mandates of the UN peacekeeping missions have veritable contents. However, once the different countries from where troops are called from get deployed, they stepped in with their individual national interests in the war-torn country where they are deployed and this drives the undercurrent of geostrategic infiltrating role.”

The respondent even went as far as saying, “During one of his missions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo being our case study in this study, especially the part that is close to Rwanda, it was reported that some of the UN peacekeeping contingents especially those from India demonstrated some misconduct. As such, once the information was reported to the Headquarters, little or nothing was done. What even exacerbated the situation which the Brigadier General recounted was that some of the DRC soldiers were complicit who instead of preempting any form of geostrategic behaviour from the mixed UN peacekeepers on their territory, rather they helped the UN peacekeepers by granting them access to exploit the natural resources of their country illicitly and received compensation. Therefore he said, while visualizing geostrategic role solely on the prism of the peacekeepers, he said it should be made emphatically clear that the Africans are complicit in helping the UN peacekeepers in carrying out geostrategic related activities”

He also went further to say that, “Still in the DRC, there are many international non-governmental organizations present and are classified as humanitarian agencies. This multiplicity of international NGO’s from different countries are into activities that are far from the very humanitarian reasons of improving the standards of living as well as alleviate the plights of the internally displaced persons and other persons of concern. This is because there are benefits that they are deriving from the DRC. By and large, they do not do these things on their own. They use the nationals to gain access to those resources. For instance cobalt, that mineral resource that is used in the fabrication of cellphones is enormous in the DRC. As such, which international NGO’s would not want to get into DRC under the banner of humanitarianism but act illegally to extract such rich product and have it smuggled out of the country? All these international multinational corporations or non-state actors the respondent said that produce cellphones get the product cobalt hugely from DRC. And how do you think this product get to them if not of the geostrategic behaviours of the UN peacekeepers and international NGO’s who get there with humanitarian assistance and claim they are they for humanitarian action which is a façade. A façade in the sense that much more than intervening for humanitarian action, they are rather there to extract illegally cobalt and other rich mineral deposits the DRC is endowed with using even the nationals to smuggle the natural resources out of the country. Each of the UN peacekeeping contingents has their agenda giving to them by their own member state in order to drive their own national interests. That is, if everybody is doing it while can’t we do it to. Unfortunately these are not things you can openly say this country is doing this, that country is doing that except they are legally apprehended and exposed. But unfortunately money comes into play here as people always buy out their illegalities. So in a nutshell, to a very large extent, Africans themselves are complicit to the geostrategic

infiltration of the UN peacekeepers on the field—a position from Brigadier General Pumzile James Mackakaire, one time Director of the African Peace Support Trainer Association (APSTA).”



UN Peacekeeping Map from the UN Cartographic Section, April 2018: <www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/P_K_O.pdf>.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

This section wrap up the study on geostrategic infiltration in UN peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa with the case of ONUC in the DRC. A deeper understanding as to why the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo was accused by non-Western countries of having been reduced to a proxy military force for the advancement of US foreign policy manoeuvres and not as a conflict resolution agent of the UN

Security Council (Al-Qaq R.K, 2009, p. 63). The results and discussions further highlights ONUC's failure to tackle the crisis triggering challenges that the Congolese Government had requested the UN military force to deal with. During the first year of its deployment in Congo, ONUC did not engage itself in any robust diplomatic and military offensive operations to evict the foreign invading forces. Instead, the leadership of ONUC became embroiled in the power politics of Congo that resulted in the assassination of Lumumba with ONUC's connivance. Ultimately ONUC became the legitimizing force of an unelected and undemocratic dictatorial regime that was installed to serve Western interests and not the self-determination aspirations of the Congolese people (Saksena, K.P, 1974, p. 97).

During the first few weeks of deployment ONUC failed to immediately engage the invading Belgian troops and secessionist Katangese troops, as requested by the Congolese authorities. As a result of this failure, the UN force was harassed and rebuked rather than being assisted by the Congolese Government as tribal and ideological considerations fuelled by outside forces were tearing the Congolese government apart (Saksena, K.P, 1974, p. 109). The role of outside military and political forces in transforming ONUC into a US proxy force is fully explained by the selection and appointment of key decision makers in the affairs of ONUC. Additionally, most pundits have articulated that it should not come as a surprise as UN peacekeeping missions were designed as political games that are played at the grand strategic level among the competing world powers with little consideration paid to the ultimate effects on the local population (Tsagourias, N, 2006, pp. 38-43)

The first UN guiding principle in the selection of troop contributing countries for ONUC was that no military unit or staff officer from any of the permanent members of the Security Council was to participate "given the potential...to escalate rather than reduce cold War rivalries" (Annan, K. A, 2012, p. 33). The second principle was that the concept of regionalism in the resolution of international conflicts was to be upheld hence the appeal to African leaders to provide the bulk of the peacekeeping troops (Simmonds, R, 1968, p. 137). These principles were both violated at the onset of the operation. The appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary General to Congo, Ralph Bunche a seasoned American diplomat who was also the overall commander of ONUC in the field during the early days of its deployment was in violation of the first principle that prohibited staff officers and troops. This is rational especially staffs belonging to permanent members of the Security Council participating in UN peacekeeping operations. It also contributed to the violation of the peacekeeping principle of "impartiality." The principle of impartiality in this study is defined as follows: "peacekeepers will be expected to serve universalistic interest and must not serve the parochial interests of specific foreign powers, which seek to project their influence into the conflict in question" (Gibbs, D.N, 2000, p. 360). The critical importance of impartiality has been emphasized by several scholars. James (1996) emphasizes that "it is impartiality which gives peacekeepers its distinctiveness as it is the lifeblood of peacekeeping."

Summarily this article has spotted out imperative areas following the UN peacekeeping deployment in DRC following the outbreak of an intra-state armed conflict in 1960. That is, the United Nations Operation in the Congo. We have envisaged how geostrategic infiltration aside from other challenges contributed enormously in curtailing the consolidation of ONUC's mandate in the DRC in 1960. And this is explained by the overwhelming

concealed geostrategic interests incorporated behind UN peacekeepers deployed in conflicts ridden spots especially in Africa with the DRC examined in this study. Therefore, it is recommended that internal reforms on how to reinvigorate the UN peacekeeping operations deployed in conflict affected spots in Africa for confidence building in their interventions is pertinent as well as a necessity.

CONCLUSION

To cap it up, the fundamental objective of this study was to demonstrate how geostrategic infiltration constitutes a great stake in the successful consolidation of the mandates of the UN peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-state armed conflicts in Africa, with the case of UN peacekeeping ONUC deployed in the DRC in 1960 being the main case study in this study. To attain this objective, salient facts were brought up and argued logically. The results of the study shows that geostrategic infiltration of Congo's internal politics by some high ranking ONUC's officials that significantly contributed to the host government's failure to exercise its autonomy towards advancing the aspirations of its people as UN officials promoted American and Allied Powers' interests. And it is but obvious this was done at the expense of the Congolese people as argued above. The Congo crisis (1960-64) marked a significant watershed in the evolution of peacekeeping. For the first time ever, the UN got embroiled in domestic affairs of the host country thus setting a major precedent on future UN interventions in domestic affairs of host countries. The geostrategic challenge in UN interventions in civil conflicts is that the world body risks becoming embroiled in internal conflicts thereby compromising its "Ostensible role as a non-partisan mediator." The result also reveals that the UN intervention in Congo served as a "midwife to the arrival of the Cold War in Africa; and it inadvertently aborted...Congo's transition from colonial to democratic rule" (Collins, C.J, 1993, P. 117). This abortion was a deliberate and successful attempt to promote American interests during the Cold War at the expense of Congolese wishes and aspirations for political and economic self-determination that were thwarted in favour of promoting western neo-liberal political and economic interests. Furthermore, the result further demonstrated that it is false to argue that peacekeeping operations are primarily designed to bring about peace and tranquility to the host nation state. The UN mission in Congo was meant to facilitate the introduction and entrenchment of American hegemony in Central and Southern Africa in replacement of the departing colonial powers during decolonization. This view is confirmed by Wedgwood (1995) who noted that the US likes peacekeeping operations because they are "The denouement, the winding down of old battles for influence in the Third World between strategic opponents" in which the American hegemony replaces departed colonial powers. This is what transpired in Congo where the peacekeeping mission was used to effect a well calculated and executed regime change agenda. And lastly the result further reveals that UN peacekeepers deployed in the Congo during the early 1960's did not serve the interests of the Congolese people they purported to have gone to serve and protect. The peacekeepers were used as a proxy force to advance geostrategic interests of the US and her Western allies.

We therefore recommend that reforms aimed at reinstating veritable role of the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa faced with intra-state armed conflicts are paramount. While this study takes into account the fact veritable consolidation of the mandates of the UN peacekeepers is at the inception of the creation of the UN

peacekeeping missions as revealed in this work, coupled with the non-coherent role on the part of the peacekeepers in the deployed countries hit by intra-state armed conflicts which is explained to a great extent by geostrategic infiltration as espoused in this study, calls for concern. Therefore, it is recommended that the UN should rather reinforce regional economic communities and the African Union with logistic support and allow them uninfluenced to orchestrate charting the path to peace and stability in consolidation of the mandate of restituting peace and stability in the countries hit by intra-state armed conflicts in Africa. For instance, should the UN rather reinforced the culpability of the Congolese troops requested and/or sub-regional and regional body like the then Organization of African Unity today known as African Union with logistic support and allowed them broker peace in DRC, it could have delivered better results over the intervention of ONUC. This position of course could not have been taken because it would have pre-empted geostrategic infiltration of the US and her ally in the operation. Therefore should the UN engages on a reform of reinforcing African regional economic communities and the African Union otherwise referred to as south-south reinforcement, then it would obviously not only have rekindled its veritable role but most especially would have gone a long way to accelerate the quelling of not only the protracted intra-state armed conflict in the DRC in 1960, but also several other intra-state armed conflicts threatening peace, security and development in the African continent-especially those intra-states armed conflicts during the post-cold war decade and those in the last two decades of the 21st Century.

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