

# **Optimism vs Determinism vs Fatalism**

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#### Abstract

Philosophy deals with an effort to comprehend basic facts about who we are, the world in which we live, and how we relate to one another and the world. As admirers of wisdom in ancient times, philosophers found connections to any field in which intelligence were demonstrated. Similarly, doctrine of studies is available on different concepts such as optimism, determination, and fatalism related to fate and the beliefs of philosophers. This article demonstrated the conceptual history, principles, and attitudes of different philosophers about these three to compare them.

Keywords: Optimism, Determinism, Fatalism, Orgin, Principles, and French Philosophy

#### 1. Introduction

An optimistic mindset is one that is filled with optimism, confidence, and a good outlook on life. Optimists often see obstacles as teaching opportunities or transient setbacks. Further, although this is only one form of fatalism, some people may think that God has predetermined our fate. On the other hand, determinism holds that every event in our lives is determined by past experiences and deeds, in addition to the idea that we have a single, predetermined fate. Different philosophers have different opinions about all three. In the following section, detail over these has been given.

#### 1.1 Optimism

The word comes from "best" in Latin, optimal. In the traditional meaning of the word, optimism is the expectation of the best result in any given circumstance. In psychology, this is typically referred to as dispositional optimism. It conveys a conviction that things will turn out well in the future. Furher optimism is the philosophical view that the world is the best possible place to live, or the ethical belief that life is worthwhile. The philosophical perspective may entail theodicy, or the defense of God's creation theory. The

French Jesuits of Trévoux originated the term optimisme in 1737, and Voltaire used it as the subtitle for his Candide (1759), citing Leibniz's Théodicée as support<sup>1</sup>. With the rise of atheistic philosophies in the 20th century, ethical theory was widely debated, and Albert Camus emerged as a prominent defender of it. The detailed definition of the origin of optimism has been discussed below.

## 1.1.1 Origin of optimism

Leibniz's theory of the most effective world, or optimism, has a well-known back-story that begins in the eighteenth century and ends when a huge earthquake strikes Lisbon on November 1, 1755, shattering the foundation of the theory<sup>2</sup>. This narrative, despite its lengthy history, is nothing more than the fabrication of pundits that has gained traction not because of overwhelming proof but rather because of repeated occurrences.

There is a long history behind this story. "England, France, and Germany were ruled by optimism at the turning point of the 18th century," asserted Wilhelm Lütgert over 100 years ago. However, according to Lütgert 1901<sup>3</sup>, "the [Lisbon] earthquake disturbed the thoughtless comfort of optimism." "For the entirety of Europe, the Lisbon [earthquake] symbolises the beginning of the end of the [eighteenth] century, whenever the hopefulness of the Enlightenment suddenly transforms into pessimism," said Harald Weinrich a decade later (Weinrich 1971, 71)<sup>4</sup>. Even more plainly, Jürgen Moltmann asserted that "the shock of the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 destroyed the optimistic outlook on the world held by the philosophers of the Enlightenment." (Meyer 1983, 565)<sup>5</sup>.

These kinds of assertions have two odd characteristics. First of all, they are always made as though they were somehow self-evident or self-confirming, and without any supporting data. Secondly, their explanation for how precisely the Lisbon earthquake is meant to have weakened hope is surprisingly nebulous. For instance, it's not obvious if the assertion is that the earthquake caused self-professed optimists to give up on optimism, or if it led to optimism losing supporters, or both. It really doesn't matter which of these hypothetical assertions is meant to be true because they are all untrue. To put it plainly, the notion that the Lisbon earthquake destroyed optimism is a fabrication of commentators that has gained traction based more on repetition than on the strength of the data.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Optimism (no date) Encyclopædia Britannica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/optimism (Accessed: 25 November 2023).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Strickland, L., 2019. Staying Optimistic!: The Trials and Tribulations of Leibnizian Optimism. In *Leibniz's Legacy and Impact* (pp. 53-86). Routledge.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ramaker, A.J., 1902. Die Erschütterung des Optimismus durch das Erdbeben von Lissabon 1755.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Weinrich, H., 1971. Literatur für Leser: Essays und Aufsätze zur Literaturwissenschaft. Sprache und Literatur, 68.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Moltmann, Jürgen. "Theodicy." In A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, edited by Alan Richardson and John Bowden, 564–566. London: SCM Press, 1983

Leibniz not only argues why God would create the finest world but also what characteristics make the world we live in the best in Theodicy. Let's start with Leibniz's belief that God will produce the best. The central tenet of his theory is that all possible things—that is, items that are not implied or contain contradictions—as well as every potential combination of these things, or feasible worlds—that is, collections of laws and things that are mutually compatible, each with a distinct history, According to Leibniz, God would come up with the most favorable of these scenarios, stating that as God is almighty, he can create any scenario, and because he is omniscient, he knows which potential universe will be the best, and completely good, which means he will only select the best.

Leibniz maintains that God had free will to choose the ideal world, despite the possibility that this reasoning suggests God was forced to make this decision because there doesn't seem to be any other option that would be compatible with his flawless nature. He contends that God's selection of the best in the world is an act of freedom that 'comprises in intelligence, that is, an unambiguous understanding of the goal of contemplation, in improvisation, in which we determine, and in uncertainty, that is, in excluding anything of logical or metaphysical necessity'. He says that God's desire is set on selecting the greatest because, like all wills, it naturally gravitates to the course that is thought to be best, and because of his superior intelligence, he guarantees that, in his case, what is thought to be best is indeed best. The best world, however, according to Leibniz, "includes the entire sequence, the impact, and the method," and is not just a well-curate collection of items.

Throughout the Theodicy, Leibniz asserts that "God was obligated by his goodness... to make his decision for a universe as would offer the greatest number of instances of order, regularity, virtue, and happiness," despite the fact that he frequently emphasizes variety and simplicity in his depiction of the ideal world. Note that this does not imply that God would select a world devoid of sin and misery.

Theodicy received a lot of favorable reviews in the early years following its release in German, French, and British publications. However, even though all of the reviewers brought up Leibniz's theory of the best world, they did so in an unbiased manner, merely summarizing Leibniz's arguments without offering any evidence to support or refute them.

Leibnizian optimism's prospects in the 1730s were mostly similar to those of the 1720s in that it garnered a lot of support as well as some criticism. However, while critics of optimism in the 1720s focused their attacks on Leibniz's interpretation of the theory, or on a near approximation of it, this was not always the case in the 1730s and later, as a new form of optimism first appeared in a 1733 poem by the English poet Alexander Pope

(1688–1744)<sup>6</sup>. Pope attempted to defend God's methods to man in his literary masterwork Essay on Man, which included admitting that the world God made was the finest.

Pope (1733, 6, 14) connected the concept of the ideal universe to the antiquated concept of the vast chain of being, according to which each creature has a distinct role within a harmonious and flawless whole that represents all conceivable levels of perfection, ranging from nothingness to God.8 Because nothing could be added or withdrawn from such a system without harming the total, Pope came to a decision that "whatever is, is RIGHT."

In two works that Crousaz produced in 1737 and 1738<sup>7</sup> criticizing Pope, he additionally criticised Leibniz on occasion, but he never cited him. As God "is envisaged with the necessity of generating such an environment as we see, and deprived of the liberty of choice," Crousaz's main criticism of Leibniz was that his theory of the best world eliminates divine freedom.

The thriving natural theology movements, and especially the design argument, that many supporters believed showed the tremendous perfection of God's craftsmanship, served as an inspiration for Gottsched's statements (albeit few were willing to go as far as Gottsched and associate this claim with optimism). Between 1735 and 1778, Gottsched's book would be reissued four times, guaranteeing that his message of hope would receive a considerable lot of attention in Germany. However, after the Theodicy, it was by no means the most significant justification for Leibnizian optimism.

Hence, even though Leibniz's theory gained a lot of traction in the 1720s and 1730s, particularly in Germany, backing for it had essentially dried up before the mid-1740s. In addition, although Leibniz's detractors were relatively few in the 1710s and 1720s, they got more vocal in the 1730s and later, generating a variety of objections that combined to render Leibniz's optimism theologically and philosophically poisonous years beforehand the Lisbon earthquake

## 1.1.2 Principle of optimism

Leibniz appeared certain that science would ultimately validate his sense of optimism. Best of all possible worlds is the principle of optimism. In his work, , that was entirely devoted to defending the justice of God, Leibniz presents his case for the notion of the best of all possible worlds—now known as Leibnizian optimism—in its whole form . Leibniz's answer to the seeming contradiction between the belief that God is omniscient, omnipresent, and omnibenevolent (completely good) and the demonstrable existence of evil

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Pope, A., An Essay on Man. Part 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> de CROUSAZ, J.P., 1738. Examen de l'Essay de Monsieur Pope sur l'homme, chez Marc-Mich Bousquet & Comp.,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Gottsched, J.C., 1753. De optimismi macula diserte nuper Alexandro Poplo.. (Doctoral dissertation).

(including sin and unjustified suffering) in the world is thus found in this argument. In broad strokes, the argument goes like this:

- 1. God is all-knowing (omnipotent), all-powerful (omniscient), and all-benevolent (omnibenevolen).
- 2. The world as it is today was made by God.
- 3. There exist alternate conceivable worlds in which God might not have created anything at all.
- 4. God was capable to build a world of excellence since he is omnipotent and omniscient, and he decided to create that world out of omnibenevolence;
- 5. As a result, the world that God created and is now in existence is the most wonderful place on earth.

Leibniz claimed that if there had been no ideal world, then God wouldn't have needed sufficient justification to create one world over another, and therefore he wouldn't have created any universe at all. This was in response to the argument that, since the variety of possible worlds is endless; there is no single possible world that could be considered the best. However, since he brought forth the current world, it has to be the finest one that could exist.

Leibniz countered the argument that the current world is not the finest of all conceivable worlds because it is simple to conceive a world with less evil by arguing that it is debatable if such a world is actually imaginable. It's possible that any universe devoid of the evil of the current world would inevitably contain other, more terrible forms of evil due to the interconnection of all things. Moreover, it is plausible that the current world, in spite of its seeming wickedness, is optimal in light of a divine criterion of goodness that deviates from common understandings of that idea.

#### 1.1.3 Philosophies of French writers about optimism

In Germany, support for Leibniz's theory had been steady throughout the 1720s and 1730s, but it began to wane in the 1740s, with the theory making its final push in the early half of that decade. It's interesting that the final thorough defenses of Leibnizian optimism came from French and Swiss writers, despite the hostility the movement had faced in France and Switzerland (mostly from Castel and Crousaz) and the strong backing it had received in Germany.

A summary of "the basic opinions of M. Leibniz on metaphysics" is presented in the first parts of Emilie du Châtelet's (1706–1749) Institutions de physique (1740), wherein she asserts that these defences were "established... from the publications of the celebrated Wolff" (du Châtelet 2009, 123)<sup>9</sup>. Her optimism is definitely very Wolffian in several ways.

He asserts that "to act adhering to an action of one's own will is considered free" and that "God selected our world from an infinite number of possible worlds as it delighted him the most" (du Châtelet 2009, 143). Du

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Du Châtelet, E., 2009. Selected philosophical and scientific writings. University of Chicago Press.

Châtelet describes the ideal universe as "that where the most diversity exists with the largest order and in which the greatest number of consequences is produced by the most fundamental laws," among other statements that have a more Leibnizian tone (du Châtelet 2009, 144). Leibniz's "Principles of Nature and Grace," which assert that that "there constitutes the most significant variety collectively with the strongest order; the greatest impact is generated in the simplest ways," is the best possible theory for the universe, is presumably the source of her description. The question of whether du Châtelet's mention of "the largest number of effects... generated by the simplest laws" is a deliberate rephrasing of Leibniz's "the greatest effect produced by the simplest ways" or a misinterpretation of it remains unanswered as she does not go into detail about her description of the ideal world. It should be noted that in the 1740s, Leibniz's theory of the perfect world received tardy acceptance not only in France and Switzerland but additionally in Britain, where poet and physician Mark Akenside (1721–1770) supported it in a poem titled The Pleasures of Imagination (1744)<sup>10</sup>. Describe how God came to select our globe.

It is likely that the ideology had lost its sway over their own countrymen by that point, therefore critics from Britain and France saw no need to provide in-depth analyses of Leibnizian optimism. This was not the situation in Germany, though, where critics took optimism considerably more seriously and produced well-reasoned criticisms. One of them could be found in the little book *De hoc mundo optimo non perfectissimo*<sup>11</sup> a young composition by Georg Christian Croll (1728–1790), who taught at the Zweibrücken Grammar School before becoming a professor. There are two noteworthy aspects to Croll's book. First of all, he only makes a single, brief mention of Leibniz while discussing other optimists—Wolff and Bilfinger, in particular—in great detail, demonstrating once more that optimism was not always regarded as a wholly Leibnizian theory, even in his native Germany. Second, contrary to what both optimists and non-optimists had previously believed to be the same thing, Croll makes a distinction between the best world and the most perfect one.

According to Croll (1752, 15 and 18), there is a world that is more perfect than ours—one in which there are no moral or physical evils—and this world cannot be the most perfect because Adam did not fall into it. But according to Croll (1752, 18), this does not imply that our world is not the finest; in fact, he believes that it always must be since God always desires the best and so had to have commanded the creation of the best world. Our world is the best because it fully realises the purpose that God intended for himself when he created it, and he uses the best tools possible to do this. Croll does not state what God's purpose was, but it is obvious that it was not to create the most ideal world possible because it may be assumed that he did not want such world to exist (Croll 1752, 16).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Akenside, M., 1768. The pleasures of imagination: A poem in three books. W. Coke.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Crollius, J.P., 1752. De hoc mundo optimo non perfectissimo. Hallanzy.

The research of philosopher and Lutheran pastor Christian August Crusius (1715–1775), who by then had already established a name as a scathing critic of Leibniz and Wolff, produced a far more significant German critique in the mid–1740s. He wrote Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, wiefern

sie den zufälligen entgegen gesetzt werden<sup>12</sup>. Crusius challenges Leibniz's assertion that the world we live in is ideal in a number of ways. He begins by discounting the notion that the best possible world exists, stating that "such a best world, where there would exist every possibility of perfection, is impossible." Because every universe must be limited, its perfection must likewise be finite, and God is able to continuously add to it by a progressive infinity. He asserts that it is "absurd and contradictory "to insist that a universe may be endless, and that this is the exclusive domain of God. After undermining a fundamental idea underlying hope. He dismisses the argument, pointing out that it assumes the existence of a best of all conceivable worlds, a premise he feels he has already demonstrated is unfounded. Not satisfied to just expose optimism's theoretical incoherence and the flaws in the case made for it, he goes on to contend that, even in the event that the best possible world existed, it would be a violation of God's freedom to assume, as Leibniz does, that God could or would chose just that world. According to him, a will cannot be properly free until it is completely unrestrained in its actions, "neither internally nor externally necessary," and therefore have a genuinely open choice between the options that are available to it.

#### 1.2 Determinism

There are various philosophies that attempt to explain how the universe functions and why particular things happen the way they do. People frequently base their decisions on various ideas, which leads to disagreements over which is the right answer. One of the most widely accepted theories that seeks to explain how things in life are predetermined is determinism.

The idea or theory of determinism is predicated on the idea that an individual has no influence over the physical events that occur. Determinists hold that every action and occurrence is shaped by a predefined number of conditions, which ultimately determines the outcome for each individual. Every action has a cause, which makes it predictable. Numerous disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, and even behavioral treatment, use determinism.

In the sixth or seventh century BCE, Greek philosophers like Heraclitus and Leucippus introduced the idea of determinism. Aristotle later examined and elaborated on it. Numerous other Eastern and Western religions, including Buddhism and Taoism, have also been modified to have deterministic meanings and concepts since their inception. The Irish philosopher William Hamilton coined the term "determinism" in 1846 to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Crusius, C.A., 1766. Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, wiefern sie den zufälligen entgegen gesetzet werden (dritte Auflage).

characterize behaviors that are impacted by a predetermined chain of causality. In the following section, the history behind the origin of the philosophy behind determinism has been explained.

## 1.2.1 Origin of determinism

The presence of free will caused disagreement amongst the early Greek philosophers. The Pythagoreans, who lived in the fifth century BCE, believed that moral accountability could not exist without it. Similarly, Socrates (c. 470–399 BCE) and Plato (c. 428–347 BCE) were eager to highlight the ethical implications of every philosophical issue. Aristotle also held that no one can predict the future because an individual is ultimately accountable for their deeds.

Democritus (c. 460–370 BCE) and Leucippus (c. 5th cent. BCE) were among the earliest Greek atomists to view the universe as entirely mechanicalistic. The lone surviving passage from Leucippus's writings, "Nothing happens at random, but everything from rational principle and of necessity," declares a global determinism.

There's only one surviving excerpt of Leucippus. It's true "Nothing happens at random, but all things for a reason and of necessity." This is undoubtedly proof that determinism exists; nevertheless, we are unsure of Leucippus's exact level of determinism. It's possible that he still saw "necessity" as a "force" similar to Empedocles' Love and Strife. Democritus later developed what was perhaps the full determinism by which everything happens simply because of the qualities inherent from eternity in the atoms and in the vacuum. But two passages from Aristotle and Theophrastus demonstrate just how important Leucippus was as a logician.

Numerous philosophical and cultural circumstances have contributed to the development of deterministic ideas. However, Pierre-Simon LaPlace (1814/1951)<sup>13</sup> made the most important and conclusive claim early in the nineteenth century. It is paradoxical that he was a statistician because determinism challenges one of the fundamental tenets of probability theory, which is that several outcomes can arise from the same circumstance.

LaPlace noted that, in theory, if an extremely intelligent super-mind had perfect knowledge of the rules of nature and the current state of every particle in the universe, it could theoretically calculate every future occurrence with perfect accuracy. In fact, one could precisely determine the condition of the universe down to the last detail at any given moment in the past or future if they had such comprehensive knowledge of the arrangement of particles at any given point in time, along with a complete and accurate understanding of all causal principles.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Pierre Simon, D.E., 1951. Laplace. Trans. by Truscott and Emory, Frederick Lincoln.[1814].

This is sometimes expressed as viewing the cosmos as a massive machine that operates moment by moment according to a predetermined schedule. Since the Big Bang, or maybe for a few seconds after, everything that occurs today has been preordained.

LaPlace's theory suggests that while individuals won't be able to foresee the future with absolute accuracy anytime soon, it is theoretically feasible with the correct information and tools. The important conclusion is that there is just one viable course for the future. Because there is only one right answer, all future events must be predetermined.

One of the main characteristics of determinism is the appearance of many options. If everything that happens in the future is predetermined, then the human ability to choose between several courses of action is artificially limited. Determinists place a strong emphasis on epistemic possibilities, which are those that are conceivable in terms of thought but not in the real world. In other words, an individual may hold the subjective opinion that there are several options, and this belief may really have a causal impact on the individual's actions. There is a subjective (and erroneous) belief in various possibilities, which is a part of the deterministic causal chain, but there is no actual reality of simple possibility in the physical sense.

## 1.2.2 Principle of determinism

The concept of causality, or the link between cause and effect, is connected to determinism. Since determinism expands on and is inherently characterized by the belief in causation, philosophers regard it as a more robust conviction than causality. According to the determinism principle, everything that happens is a direct effect of a primary cause. There are situations in which an action or event will result in a result or impact that is not always under human control.

As an example, millions of dollars' worth of damage are caused when a powerful hurricane passes over a sizable town, destroying numerous residences. The hurricane is the root cause of the devastation, and the loss of a substantial quantity of property and other personal belongings is the result. There is no human influence over the event's cause. Determinists hold that there was no other possible outcome and that the preconditions of this scenario—that is, the specific circumstances or influences that lead to a result—were completely predetermined.

#### 1.2.3 Philosophies of French writers about determinism

Discussion on determinism occurred in the French-speaking world mostly in the second half of the 1800s, or more precisely, around 1880. A book written by French doctor Claude Bernard in 1865 was meant to serve as an introduction to "experimental medicine<sup>14</sup>." He emphasized the peculiarities of biological processes while also emphasizing the need for a scientific explanation because there were issues with determinism and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Bernard, C., 1865. Introduction à l'étude de la médecine expérimentale (No. 2). Baillière.

fundamental values. Determinism was relevant to the experimental design since it was nothing more than the idea that tests could be repeated.

The existentialist writer and French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre would contest the existence of any "human nature" other than freedom. The philosophy of existentialism holds that nothing exists outside of man and that everything else is either existing or nonexistent. According to Jean Paul Sartre, this is demonstrated by the ideas that man's existence comes before his essence and that neither God nor evolution nor anything else could have purposefully created humans<sup>15</sup>.

According to (Hospers 1970)<sup>16</sup> the idea that a human being is free to use his freedom whichever he pleases is opposed by determinism. The determinists typically claim that "all actions taken by humans are the result of or influenced by certain forces" and that "human liberty is an illusion." Put another way, everything that occurs in the universe at any given time is the result of something that happened in the past, meaning that the past always shapes the present.

Further Ebun Oduwole asserts that "determinism is the principle of universal causality" (Oduwole, 1997:245), meaning that it is a prerequisite for all rational explanations.<sup>17</sup>

#### 1.3 Fatalism

Fatalism is a mentality that believes everything that occurs is predetermined or bound to happen or or destiny has predetermined events and that there is nothing that humanity can do to alter them is known as fatalism.. It could be assumed that accepting anything implies believing in a decreeing or binding agent. Ancient Greek and Roman mythology, with its embodiment of fate, and Norse mythology, with the Norns, are where this implication first emerged. It is helpful to distinguish between later fatalism ideas and determinism, even though they can be broadly characterized as equivalent. While determinism can be argued to be consistent with moral responsibility, a correct understanding of fatalism would reduce practical ethics to the suggestion that people should accept the way things happen without intervening.

## 1.3.1 Origin of Fatalism

The writings of the ancient Greeks and Romans are among the earliest examples of fatalism. In these prehistoric societies, fate is frequently personified by anthropomorphic gods and goddesses and depicted in literary works. It was also around this time that logical arguments against fatalism were made. With the spread

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Sartre, J. P., 1980. c.f. Leslie Stevenson, The Study of Human Nature. New York: Oxford University Press.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Hospers, J., 1970. An introduction to philosophical Analysis. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. Translated by H. E. Barnes. (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1969) P. 438.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Odesanmi, A.C., 2008. Jean Paul Sartre and the concept of determinism. *Global Journal of Humanities*, 7(1&2), pp.85-89.

of Christianity during the Middle Ages, philosophical thought underwent certain shifts, yet the centrality of fatalism in the discussion persisted.

It is stated that the concept that there are happenings in the world that no one exercises authority over led the ancient Greeks to a state of resignation. Greek plays like Antigone provide as cultural examples of this concept. Greek plays frequently depict people's futures as being determined by the whims or will of the gods.

Fatalism was a common tool employed in the Middle Ages to provide meaning to unexplainable events, such as natural calamities. For instance, the arrival of a plague in a city was considered an unavoidable act of God.

Some political figures have utilized fatalism as an ideology to support their policies. Napoleon Bonaparte, for instance, thought he was destined to be the world's ruler. This idea is also present in some authoritarian governments, when the ruling class feels that their rule is inevitable and that anyone who challenges them is battling against the hand of fate<sup>18</sup>.

## 1.3.2 Principle of Fatalism

According to fatalists, deeds cannot be attributed to free will because they are neither freely selected nor selfemitted. Destiny is a collection of upcoming occurrences that, regardless of the steps made to alter them, cannot be averted.

The claim that every occurrence in the past, present, and future is or has been inevitable is known as fatalism's principle. People who hold this viewpoint, known as fatalists, believe that nothing could have happened or could have been done differently than what actually occurred. Instead, fatalism is linked to the notion that a particular result was "meant to be" in the sense that people and their choices have no bearing whatsoever on any particular outcome. Fatalism, as its name implies, derives from the word fate, underscoring the idea that human control over the future is impossible. Because outcomes are determined by forces outside of an individual, fatalists argue that they cannot be considered the consequence of free will and instead view their future as predetermined or inevitable.

## 1.3.3 Philosophies of French writers about Fatalism

Denis Diderot wrote a novel titled Jacques the Fatalist and his Master (Jacques le fataliste et son maître) between 1765 and 1780. The first French edition arrived posthumously in 1796, but German readers were

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Arlin Cuncic, M. (2022) *What is fatalism?*, *Verywell Mind*. Available at: https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-fatalism-5272255 (Accessed: 27 November 2023).

already familiar with it via Schiller's 1785 partial translation, which was later translated into French in 1793, and Mylius's 1792 full German translation.

One might anticipate a developed argument, if the novel were simply "about" fatalism, but this is not the case. In fact, convulsion has been reached is not present. Jacques can gain credibility from his master by engaging in discussions about the concept of free will, but there isn't any traditional explanation provided investigation of problems\_ Following this line of inquiry, one would wonder if there is any difference, aside from the time and space allotted to them,-between the conversation about women and the one about fatalism.which Diderot discovered, devoted to a philosophical doctrine that rejected his requirement for a single universe where moral decision-making held any significance.

This reading of Jacques is tenable and is supported by the text as well as Eliderot's writing style (Jacques is not the only work of Diderot that addresses dilemmas and unresolved conflicts in his ideas and personality). First of all, it would be incorrect to interpret this peculiar and intricate book only in terms of how it presents certain philosophical ideas. Jacques' fatalism has a stronger connection with certain popular beliefs and idioms than it is with philosophical determinism. Examples include the idea that every bullet has an address on it and the idea that everything is "written work a different foundation to ethics," However, this was also the beginning of Diderot's problems, as his philosophical perspective seemed to rule out any chance of creating a stable foundation for ethics other than through useful social engineering: if everything is predetermined, then free will is absurd, and even though, we cannot make man a real oral beeing, even if we try to do so through a system of incentives and deterrents that is appropriate for the social environment.

Is it determinism or freedom? This serves as the foundation for a philosophical analysis of Jacques. The fatalistic Jacques adheres to a strict kind of deterministic behaviour, believing that everything is predetermined and "written up above," in his own words. However, he frequently defies this belief with behaviours and emotions that are consistent with the conduct of a moral being. After then, the book can be interpreted as a rational elaboration.

#### Conclusion

This article has gone through the three different concepts of optimism, determination, and fatalism, explaining these three clearly from the point of view of philosophy. For this, the article starts with a simple philosophy and then its origin and principles. In order to justify the theory, the French philosophy has been investigated in favor of or against the three concepts.