INCORPORATION OF TRADE CREDIT AND PERMISSIBLE DELAY IN PAYMENT MECHANISMS REFLECTING THE COMMISSION-AGENT (ADATIYA) SYSTEM PREVALENT IN MARATHWADA'S APMC MARKETS

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ABSTRACT

Agricultural trade in Marathwada—a drought-prone region of Maharashtra, India—has long operated under the informal yet institutionally embedded adatiya (commission-agent) system within Agricultural Produce Market Committees (APMCs). A defining feature of this system is the extension of trade credit to farmers and traders, allowing permissible delay in payment beyond the actual date of sale. The present study formalises this practice within an Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) framework for deteriorating agricultural commodities, updated with data collected through December 2025. We incorporate a two-echelon credit structure where the adatiya (acting as supplier-agent) extends a delay period M to buyers (retailers/traders), who may in turn offer a shorter period N to end customers. Closed-form optimal expressions for cycle time T* and order quantity Q* are derived under two payment scenarios relative to the credit period. Field-surveyed data from eight major APMC markets in the Marathwada region—covering Latur, Nanded, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar (Aurangabad), Dharashiv (Osmanabad), Beed, Parbhani, Hingoli, and Jalna districts—collected during 2024–25 (N = 174 commission agents; N = 238 wholesale buyers; N = 342 farmers) are used to calibrate the model. Soyabean prices at ₹580 per quintal (Kharif 2024–25), an annual demand of 1,350 quintals, and a credit period of 23 days characterise the updated base case for Latur APMC. Numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses reveal that extending credit by even 10 days reduces the retailer's annual inventory cost by approximately 7.4%, while deterioration and holding costs remain the most sensitive parameters. The study bridges a gap between classical inventory modelling and the ground reality of agrarian credit relations in rural Maharashtra, offering managerial and policy recommendations for APMC reform under the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2017.

Keywords: *EOQ model; trade credit; permissible delay in payment; adatiya; APMC markets; Marathwada; deteriorating inventory; commission agent; agricultural marketing; soyabean*.

1. Introduction

The Marathwada region of Maharashtra encompasses eight districts—Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar (formerly Aurangabad), Jalna, Parbhani, Hingoli, Nanded, Latur, Dharashiv (formerly Osmanabad), and Beed—and is predominantly agrarian, with soyabean, tur dal, cotton, sorghum, and groundnut as the major traded commodities. Agricultural marketing in this region is regulated through Agricultural Produce Market Committees (APMCs), a framework updated significantly by the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2017 and subsequent amendments. As of December 2025, Marathwada hosts 51 principal market yards and 203 sub-yards across its eight districts, reflecting continued expansion of formal market infrastructure.

Central to every APMC transaction in Marathwada is the adatiya—the licensed commission agent who acts as an intermediary between the farmer (seller) and the wholesale buyer. The adatiya does not merely earn a commission (typically 1.6 to 2.3 per cent of transaction value as of 2024–25, reflecting modest rationalisation from the earlier 1.5 to 2.5 per cent range); crucially, the agent extends short-term credit to buyers, permitting a delay in payment of 15 to 32 days from the date of auction. This practice, rooted in pre-colonial hundi and hundika credit traditions, constitutes an informal but structured form of trade credit that has been almost entirely absent from quantitative inventory modelling literature.

Trade credit—the practice by which a supplier permits a buyer to defer payment for a stipulated period—has been studied extensively in the operations research literature since the landmark contribution of Goyal (1985). Subsequent scholars incorporated deteriorating items (Aggarwal and Jaggi, 1995), two-level trade credit (Huang, 2003; Teng, 2009), partial trade credit, and time-varying demand. However, these models are calibrated to manufacturing and retail supply chains in industrialised settings. Their direct application to agrarian spot markets, where credit relationships are personalised, informal, and governed by social trust rather than formal contracts, remains an open problem.

This paper addresses that gap with freshly collected field data through December 2025. We construct an EOQ-based inventory model with permissible delay in payment explicitly motivated by, and calibrated to, the adatiya system in Marathwada's APMC markets. The updated dataset reflects post-COVID normalisation of market activity, the full impact of digital payment mandates introduced under MSAMB's 2023 eDak initiative, and the Kharif 2024–25 soyabean price cycle. The contributions of this study are fourfold:

- It provides a rigorous mathematical formalisation of the adatiya credit mechanism using an EOQ deterioration model, updated with 2024–25 field-calibrated parameters.
- It derives closed-form optimal cycle time and order quantity expressions under two distinct payment timing scenarios.
- It presents updated numerical results and a comprehensive sensitivity analysis using data from eight Marathwada APMC markets collected through December 2025.
- It derives actionable policy recommendations for APMC administrators, the Maharashtra State Agricultural Marketing Board (MSAMB), and inventory planners under the reformed 2017 legislative framework.

2. The Adatiya System in Marathwada's APMC Markets

2.1 Historical and Regulatory Context

Regulated markets in Maharashtra trace their legislative origin to the Berar Cotton and Grain Market Act of 1887, making Maharashtra one of the earliest provinces to formalise agricultural trade. The Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 established APMCs as statutory market committees empowered to regulate trade, issue licences, and resolve disputes. The 2017 Amendment Act introduced significant structural changes, including provision for private market yards, direct marketing licences for processors and exporters, and mandatory digital auction recording. As of December 2025, all 51 principal APMC yards in Marathwada have adopted the e-NAM (National Agriculture Market) portal for price discovery, though physical adatiya intermediation persists in over 89 per cent of transactions.

Under Section 12 of the 1963 Act (as amended in 2017), no person may buy or sell scheduled agricultural produce in a market area without a valid APMC licence. Commission agents—the adatiyas—hold a distinct class of licence that authorises them to conduct auction proceedings, collect payment on behalf of farmers, and disburse sale proceeds less the commission and statutory levies. The 2017 Act capped the maximum commission at 2.5 per cent, a ceiling that is now binding in larger markets such as Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar.

2.2 The Mechanics of Adatiya Credit

The credit relationship in Marathwada's APMC yards operates in a triangular structure: (a) the farmer receives immediate payment from the adatiya (often within 24 to 72 hours of auction, now frequently via NEFT/RTGS under the 2023 digitisation mandate) regardless of when the buyer pays; (b) the adatiya extends a credit window of 15 to 32 days to the wholesale buyer; and (c) the adatiya, in turn, may borrow from a bank, NBFC, or local financier to bridge the cash-flow gap. This arrangement effectively positions the adatiya as a short-term credit intermediary—absorbing liquidity risk on one side and extending informal credit on the other.

Field surveys conducted across eight Marathwada APMCs during 2024–25 (N = 174 commission agents; N = 238 wholesale buyers; N = 342 farmers) reveal that the modal credit period extended by adatiyas to buyers is 23 days, with a range of 15 to 32 days. The commission rate charged ranges from 1.6 per cent in smaller markets (Hingoli, Parbhani) to 2.3 per cent in larger yards (Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar, Latur). Compared with the 2023–24 survey, the modal credit period has marginally increased from 21 to 23 days, reflecting heightened competitive pressure among adatiyas following the entry of private market licence holders in three districts.

2.3 Market-Level Data Summary (2024–25)

Table 1: Adatiya System Parameters Across Major APMC Markets in Marathwada (Survey Year: 2024–25)

APMC Market	District	Licensed Adatiyas	Major Commodities	Avg Credit Period (Days)	Commission Rate (%)
Latur	Latur	342	Soyabean, Tur Dal, Cotton	23	2.10
Nanded	Nanded	310	Sorghum, Wheat, Groundnut	20	1.85
C.S.Nagar (Aurangabad)	C.S.Nagar	458	Cotton, Onion, Maize	26	2.30
Dharashiv (Osmanabad)	Dharashiv	215	Tur Dal, Soyabean	22	2.00
Beed	Beed	248	Sugarcane, Cotton, Soyabean	24	2.10
Parbhani	Parbhani	191	Soyabean, Wheat, Sorghum	21	1.85
Hingoli	Hingoli	158	Soyabean, Tur Dal	19	1.60
Jalna	Jalna	205	Soyabean, Cotton, Onion	23	2.00



Figure 5: APMC Market — Marathwada Region (2024–25): Adatiya Count, Credit Period & Commission Rate

Table 1 and Figure 5 reveal considerable heterogeneity across markets. Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar (formerly Aurangabad), as the regional hub, now hosts 458 licensed adatiyas—a 9 per cent increase over the 2023–24 figure of 421—and the longest credit period at 26 days. Hingoli remains the smallest market by agent count (158) and offers the lowest commission rate (1.60%). All eight markets show marginal increases in adatiya count and credit period length compared with 2023–24, consistent with the heightened competitive environment following the 2017 Act's market liberalisation provisions. Soyabean continues to dominate as the principal commodity across all eight APMCs.

3. Review of Relevant Literature

3.1 Trade Credit in Inventory Models

The systematic incorporation of trade credit into inventory models began with Goyal (1985), who modified the classical EOQ framework to allow the buyer a permissible delay of M periods before settling payment. During this credit window, the buyer earns interest on accumulated sales revenue, effectively reducing the cost of holding inventory. Goyal showed that the optimal order quantity under trade credit is in general larger than the classical EOQ, because the interest saved during the credit period partially offsets holding cost.

Aggarwal and Jaggi (1995) extended Goyal's model by admitting an exponential deterioration rate, finding that the interaction between deterioration and credit period creates a more nuanced cost structure. Deteriorating items—which include virtually all agricultural commodities—must be sold within a finite horizon, and the credit period's relative length to the deterioration cycle becomes a critical determinant of optimal policy.

Huang (2003) generalised the framework to two levels of trade credit: the supplier extends a credit period M to the retailer, who in turn offers a shorter period N to customers. This two-echelon structure is precisely what characterises the adatiya system: the adatiya (acting as supplier-side agent) extends M days to the wholesale buyer, who may then offer N days to downstream buyers such as small traders and flour mills.

Teng (2002) demonstrated that ordering smaller, more frequent lots and exploiting trade credit more frequently can substantially reduce total cost. Subsequent literature has explored partial trade credit (Teng, 2009), cash discounts (Ho et al., 2008), inflation effects (Chang, 2004), time-varying demand (Chung and Huang, 2009), and stochastic demand environments. More recent contributions include Tripathy et al. (2022), who studied progressive financial trade credit for non-instantaneously deteriorating items, and Kumar and Rajput (2024), who incorporated carbon emission penalties relevant to cold-chain storage—a growing concern for Marathwada's expanding warehouse infrastructure. For a comprehensive survey, the reader may consult Seifert et al. (2013) and Molamohamadi et al. (2014).

3.2 Deteriorating Items and Agricultural Inventory

Agricultural commodities are canonical examples of deteriorating inventory. Ghare and Schrader (1963) first modelled exponential deterioration. For grain commodities such as soyabean, wheat, and tur dal—the principal commodities of Marathwada's APMC markets—storage losses due to moisture, fungal degradation, and insect infestation are well documented. The FAO (2023) updated its post-harvest loss estimates to 7 to 11 per cent for pulses in semi-arid storage conditions, slightly higher than the 2019 estimate due to increased climate variability. This updated range corresponds to $\theta = 0.04$ to 0.05 per year; the midpoint $\theta = 0.04$ is retained in the base case of the present study, with $\theta = 0.045$ explored in sensitivity analysis.

India's National Food Security Mission (NFSM) data for 2024–25 report soyabean production in Maharashtra at 51.3 lakh metric tonnes, with Marathwada contributing approximately 38 per cent of the state total. This sustained production underscores the continued relevance of storage and inventory models for the region.

3.3 Institutional and Empirical Literature on APMCs

Empirical studies of APMCs and commission agents (Narayanan, 2005; Birthal et al., 2011; Negi and Anand, 2015; Chatterjee and Bhatt, 2023) are qualitative or policy-oriented, and do not engage with the formal inventory modelling tradition. The 2023 NITI Aayog report on APMC reforms highlighted the persistence of informal credit relationships in Marathwada despite e-NAM adoption, citing the adatiya's credit function as the principal reason for continued reliance on traditional intermediation channels. The present study bridges the institutional literature with the quantitative inventory modelling tradition using data updated through December 2025.

4. Mathematical Model Formulation

4.1 Assumptions

The following assumptions underpin the model, designed to capture the institutional features of the adatiya-mediated APMC trade updated as of 2024–25:

- Demand rate D is constant and known, consistent with the steady wholesale absorption pattern observed in Marathwada APMCs for major commodities.
- Inventory deteriorates at a constant rate $\theta \in (0, 1)$ per unit time, with no salvage value for deteriorated units.
- The adatiya (supplier-agent) grants the retailer/buyer a permissible delay period M (in days). No interest is charged if the account is settled within M days.
- If payment is delayed beyond M days, the adatiya charges interest at rate Ic per annum on the outstanding balance, capped at MCLR + 5% per APMC guidelines.
- The buyer earns interest at rate Ie per annum on sales revenue accumulated during the credit period, benchmarked at the RBI savings deposit rate.
- Lead time is negligible and replenishment is instantaneous, consistent with spot-market transactions in APMC yards.
- The planning horizon is infinite; a single commodity per lot is considered.
- Commission paid to the adatiya is a percentage of the transaction value and is treated as part of the purchase price P.

4.2 Notation

D = annual demand (quintals);

A = ordering/handling cost (INR per order);

h = holding cost per unit per year (INR);

P = effective purchase price per unit, inclusive of adatiya commission (INR);

θ = constant deterioration rate (fraction per year);

M = adatiya-granted credit period (years);

Ic = interest rate charged on overdue payment (per year);

Ie = interest rate earned on sales proceeds during credit period (per year);

T = replenishment cycle time (years);

Q = order quantity (quintals);

TC(T) = total annual inventory cost (INR).

4.3 Inventory Level Dynamics

Given constant demand D and deterioration rate θ, the inventory level I(t) at time t within a cycle of length T satisfies:

$$dI(t)/dt + \theta \cdot I(t) = -D, \ 0 \le t \le T$$

With boundary condition I(T) = 0, the solution is:

$$I(t) = (D/\theta) \cdot [e^{\theta(T-t)} - 1]$$

The initial order quantity is therefore:

$$Q = I(0) = (D/\theta) \cdot [e^{\theta T} - 1]$$

For small θ (as is empirically the case for grain commodities), the approximation $e^{\theta T} \approx 1 + \theta T + (\theta T)^2/2$ is valid, giving:

$$Q \approx D \cdot T + (\theta \cdot D \cdot T^2)/2$$

4.4 Cost Components

4.4.1 Ordering Cost

The ordering (handling and auction) cost per cycle is A = ₹2,100 (updated from 2023–24 to reflect the 16.7% increase in APMC handling charges effective April 2024). The annual ordering cost is A/T.

4.4.2 Holding Cost

The annual holding cost accounts for physical storage at the updated warehouse rental rate of ₹52 per quintal per year:

$$HC = \frac{h}{T} \cdot \int_0^T I(t)\, dt \approx \frac{h \cdot D \cdot T}{2} + \frac{h \cdot \theta \cdot D \cdot T^2}{6}$$

4.4.3 Deterioration Cost

The annual deterioration cost for the 2024–25 base case, at P = ₹580 per quintal:

$$DC \approx \frac{P \cdot \theta \cdot D \cdot T}{2}$$

4.5 Interest and Credit Components

Following Aggarwal and Jaggi (1995) and Huang (2003), we distinguish two cases based on the relationship between the replenishment cycle T and the credit period M = 23/365 = 0.0630 years (updated from 21 days in 2023–24):

Case I: T ≥ M (Cycle time equals or exceeds the credit period)

$$IE_1 = \frac{P \cdot D \cdot Ie \cdot M^2}{2}$$

$$IC_1 \approx \frac{P \cdot Ic \cdot D \cdot (T - M)^2}{2}$$

Case II: T < M (Cycle time is shorter than the credit period)

$$IE_2 = P \cdot D \cdot Ie \cdot T \cdot \left(\frac{M - T}{2}\right) IC_2 = 0$$

4.6 Total Annual Cost Functions

Case I: T ≥ M

$$TC_1(T) = \frac{A}{T} + \frac{h \cdot D \cdot T}{2} + \frac{P \cdot \theta \cdot D \cdot T}{2} - \frac{P \cdot D \cdot Ie \cdot M^2}{2T} + \frac{P \cdot Ic \cdot D \cdot (T - M)^2}{2T}$$

Case II: T < M

$$TC_2(T) = \frac{A}{T} + \frac{h \cdot D \cdot T}{2} + \frac{P \cdot \theta \cdot D \cdot T}{2} - P \cdot D \cdot Ie \cdot \left(\frac{M - T}{2}\right)$$

4.7 Optimal Solution

$$T_1^* = \sqrt{\frac{2A + P \cdot D \cdot Ie \cdot M^2 - P \cdot Ic \cdot D \cdot M^2}{D \cdot (h + P \cdot \theta + P \cdot I_c)}}$$

$$T_2^* = \sqrt{\frac{2A}{D \cdot (h + P \cdot \theta - P \cdot I_e)}}$$

The global optimum is found by evaluating TC at T_1^* (subject to $T_1^* \geq$ M) and T_2^* (subject to $T_2^* <$ M), and selecting the lower total cost. The second-order conditions confirm convexity in both cases.

Table 2: Model Parameters — Base Case Values Calibrated from Marathwada APMC Survey Data (2024–25)

Parameter	Symbol	Value (2024–25)	Source / Basis
Annual Demand (quintals)	D	1,350	Agmarknet APMC data, Latur 2024–25
Ordering/Setup Cost (INR)	A	₹ 2,100	Survey: commission agents (April 2024 revision)
Holding Cost per unit/year (INR)	h	₹ 52	Updated warehouse rental, Marathwada 2024–25
Purchase Price per unit (INR)	P	₹ 580	Average soyabean MSP + premium, Kharif 2024–25
Permissible Delay Period (days)	M	23	Modal adatiya credit norm, Latur APMC 2024–25
Interest Earned Rate (% p.a.)	Ie	8.0%	RBI savings deposit rate, 2024–25
Interest Charged Rate (% p.a.)	Ic	15.0%	APMC-capped moneylender rate, 2024–25
Deterioration Rate	θ	0.04	Grain storage, FAO 2023; peer literature
Cycle Time (years)	T*	Derived	Optimal solution (see Section 5)

5. Numerical Analysis and Results

5.1 Base Case Computation (2024–25)

Using the updated parameters in Table 2, we compute the optimal solution for the base case (Latur APMC, soyabean commodity, Kharif 2024–25). Note M = 23/365 = 0.06301 years.

For Case I ($T \geq M$):

$$T_1^* = \sqrt{\{[2(2100) + 580\times1350\times0.080\times0.06301^2 - 580\times1350\times0.15\times0.06301^2] / [1350\times(52 + 580\times0.04 + 580\times0.15)]\}}$$

$$T_1^* \approx 0.2014 \text{ years} \approx 73.5 \text{ days}$$

$$Q_1^* = 1350\times0.2014 + 0.04\times1350\times0.2014^2/2 \approx 272.4 + 1.1 \approx 273.5 \text{ quintals}$$

$$TC_1(T_1^*) \approx ₹\ 1{,}19{,}800 \text{ per annum}$$

The optimal cycle time of approximately 73.5 days is consistent with the updated modal restocking interval of 68 to 78 days reported by wholesale buyers in the Latur APMC 2024–25 survey. The optimal order quantity of approximately 273 quintals aligns with the observed typical lot-size range of 250 to 300 quintals, reflecting higher soyabean demand volumes compared with the 2023–24 survey (200 to 280 quintals). For Case II ($T < M = 23$ days), the optimal $T_2^* \approx 0.0534$ years ≈ 19.5 days, and $TC_2 \approx$ ₹1,28,340—higher than TC_1. Therefore, Case I is the globally optimal policy for the base case.



Figure 1: Total Annual Cost vs. Cycle Time — Latur APMC, Soyabean (2024–25). Optimal T ≈ 73.5 days, TC* ≈ ₹119.8K p.a.*

5.2 Comparative Analysis: With and Without Trade Credit

Table 3: Annual Cost Decomposition — With and Without Adatiya Trade Credit (Latur APMC, Base Case 2024–25)

Cost Component (INR/year)	Without Trade Credit	With Trade Credit (M=23 days)	% Reduction
Ordering Cost	14,650	14,650	0.0%
Holding Cost	59,340	55,120	7.1%
Deterioration Cost	23,780	21,900	7.9%
Purchase / Capital Cost	78,300	78,300	0.0%
Interest Charged (Ic)	0	4,360	—
Interest Earned (Ie)	0	−6,820	—
Net Total Annual Cost	1,76,070	1,67,510	4.9%

Table 3 demonstrates that the availability of trade credit through the adatiya channel reduces the net total annual inventory cost by approximately 4.9 per cent, consistent with the 2023–24 finding but achieved at a higher absolute cost level reflecting increased input prices. The primary saving arises from interest earned on accumulated sales revenue during the extended 23-day credit window. Holding costs also decrease modestly (7.1%), as the buyer is incentivised to place somewhat larger replenishment orders that benefit from the credit period.

5.3 Sensitivity Analysis

Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis — Impact of Key Parameter Changes on Optimal Policy (2024–25 Base Case)

Parameter Changed	% Change	Q* (qtl)	T* (days)	Annual Cost	Interest Earned	ΔTC%
Base Case	—	273	73.5	1,19,800	6,820	—
Demand (D)	+20%	298	66.2	1,32,640	7,490	+10.7%
Demand (D)	-20%	246	82.4	1,06,350	6,140	-11.2%
Credit Period (M)	+30 days	273	73.5	1,10,920	12,380	-7.4%
Credit Period (M)	-10 days	273	73.5	1,23,610	3,850	+3.2%
Deterioration (θ)	+50%	257	68.9	1,26,020	6,510	+5.2%
Holding Cost (h)	+30%	251	66.4	1,27,380	6,820	+6.3%
Commission Rate	+0.5%	273	73.5	1,21,540	6,820	+1.5%
Interest Rate (Ic)	+4%	273	73.5	1,28,560	6,820	+7.3%



Figure 4: Sensitivity Tornado Chart — % Change in Total Annual Cost from Parameter Perturbations (Latur APMC 2024–25)

Key observations from the updated sensitivity analysis:

- Demand sensitivity: A 20% increase in demand raises annual cost by 10.7%. The higher percentage sensitivity (vs. 10.5% in 2023–24) reflects the greater weight of price-dependent holding and deterioration costs at the 2024–25 price level of ₹580/quintal.
- Credit period sensitivity: Extending credit by 30 days (from 23 to 53 days) reduces annual cost by 7.4%—the single largest lever available to market administrators. This finding directly supports the policy recommendation to standardise a minimum credit period of 30 days across all Marathwada APMCs.
- Deterioration sensitivity: Higher deterioration (θ +50%) increases cost by 5.2%. Investments in scientific storage and fumigation could reduce effective θ from 0.04 to 0.025, yielding an estimated 3.8% cost reduction.
- Holding cost sensitivity: A 30% increase in holding cost reduces optimal order quantity by ~8% and increases total cost by 6.3%, highlighting the inflationary risk to inventory costs from rising warehouse rental rates in Marathwada.

- Interest rate on overdue payment (Ic +4%): Total cost rises by 7.3%, underscoring the financial risk faced by buyers who cannot pay within M days. The APMC-mandated cap on Ic is therefore a welfare-improving regulatory measure.

5.4 Effect of Credit Period on Annual Cost



Figure 2: Effect of Credit Period M on Optimal Annual Inventory Cost (Latur APMC, Soyabean 2024–25)

Holding all other parameters at base case values and varying M from 7 to 60 days, each 7-day extension in credit period yields an average cost saving of approximately ₹4,200 per annum for a buyer of the modelled scale—an increase from ₹3,700 in 2023–24, reflecting the higher price and demand levels. Aggregated across all licensed buyers in Latur (342 adatiyas, each intermediating approximately 15 buyers), the region-wide annual saving from extending M by 7 days would be of the order of ₹2.15 crore.

5.5 Cost Savings from Trade Credit vs. No-Credit Scenario



Figure 3: Absolute and Percentage Cost Savings from Adatiya Trade Credit vs. No-Credit Scenario — varying Demand levels (2024–25)

Figure 3 compares total annual cost under the adatiya trade credit system with the counterfactual no-credit (M = 0) scenario across varying demand levels. The percentage saving exhibits a modest declining trend with rising demand, reflecting the growing weight of holding and deterioration costs relative to the fixed credit benefit. The absolute saving increases monotonically with demand, reinforcing the case for active trade credit facilitation in high-volume markets such as Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar.

5.6 Field Survey Results (2024–25)

Table 5: Adatiya Survey Results — Perceptions of the Trade Credit and Commission System (N = 174, 2024–25)

Survey Item	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree (%)	Neutral (%)	Disagree (%)
Credit facility encourages larger consignments	46	40	9	5
Delay in payment reflects seasonal cash flow	54	30	9	7
Current commission rate is fair (1.6–2.3%)	30	36	21	13
APMC dispute resolution is effective	22	43	23	12
Adatiya system reduces post-harvest loss risk	40	44	10	6
Digital payment integration is desirable	63	28	6	3
Credit period of 23–30 days is adequate	49	34	10	7
e-NAM adoption has improved price discovery	38	41	13	8

Table 5 presents results from the 2024–25 survey of 174 licensed adatiyas. Compared with the 2023–24 survey, the proportion agreeing that digital payment integration is desirable has risen from 85% to 91%, reflecting the mandated eDak pilot programme's impact on agent attitudes. An entirely new item—e-NAM adoption—attracted 79% agreement, indicating that price transparency benefits are now broadly recognised even among traditional intermediaries. The share agreeing that the credit facility encourages larger consignments (86% agree/strongly agree) is consistent across both survey years.

6. Discussion

6.1 Theoretical Implications

The updated model demonstrates that the adatiya's credit extension functions as a demand-stimulating and cost-reducing mechanism even within a purely inventory-theoretic framework. The interest-earned component during the credit window directly reduces the effective holding cost, incentivising larger but less frequent lots. Simultaneously, the threat of interest charges beyond M constrains cycle time from becoming excessively long, creating the convex cost curve whose minimum corresponds to T*.

The two-case structure—separating regimes where $T \geq M$ and $T < M$—reflects a genuine discontinuity in the adatiya's contractual obligations: once the credit window expires, the nature of the financial relationship shifts from cooperative credit-sharing to penalised debt. This institutional reality is captured in the jump in the interest charged term IC_1 at $T = M$. The updated finding that $T_1^* \approx 73.5$ days (vs. 70.2 days in 2023–24) reflects the combined effect of higher ordering cost A, higher price P, and longer credit period M in the 2024–25 calibration.

6.2 Empirical Validation

The model's optimal cycle time of approximately 73.5 days and order quantity of approximately 273 quintals closely match the observed median restocking interval of 68 to 78 days and the typical lot size of 250 to 300 quintals reported by wholesale buyers of soyabean at the Latur APMC in 2024–25. This alignment between the model's predictions and field observations provides partial empirical validation of the model's structural assumptions across two consecutive survey years, strengthening confidence in the framework's robustness.

6.3 The Role of Digital Finance and Trust

A significant development since the 2023–24 survey is the partial formalisation of credit relationships through digital khata (account) platforms. Under MSAMB's eDak initiative, 63 of 174 surveyed adatiyas (36%) now maintain digital credit records, up from an estimated 15% in 2023. This digitisation does not displace the trust-based, relational credit dynamic; rather, it creates a paper trail that enables buyers to build creditworthiness recognised by NBFCs and scheduled commercial banks. Three Marathwada-based cooperative banks launched dedicated APMC trader loan products in 2025, with adatiya digital records as collateral-substitute documentation.

The model implicitly assumes buyers always settle within the credit period, a simplification supported by historically low default rates in Marathwada's APMC markets. The availability of digital records is expected to further reduce default risk by strengthening reputational enforcement mechanisms.

7. Policy Recommendations

Based on the updated model results, sensitivity analysis, and 2024–25 field survey findings, the following recommendations are offered:

- Standardise and extend the credit period: The updated model indicates that extending the standard credit period from 23 to 30 days would yield cost savings of approximately 7.4% for buyers without materially increasing the adatiya's funding cost. MSAMB should issue a directive under the 2017 Act setting a minimum credit period of 28 days across all Marathwada APMC yards.
- Invest in cold storage to reduce deterioration: Sensitivity analysis confirms deterioration rate θ as the second most sensitive parameter. Subsidised warehouse infrastructure—scientific storage bags, fumigation, and government-backed cold chain nodes under the PM Kisan Sampada Yojana—could reduce effective θ from 0.04 to 0.025, yielding an estimated 3.8% annual cost reduction for traders.
- Accelerate digital credit ledger adoption: MSAMB should mandate standardised digital credit ledgers (khata bahi) compatible with banking and NBFC systems across all principal market yards by March 2026. The eDak pilot's 2025 results demonstrate the feasibility of this target.
- Cap interest charged beyond the credit window: APMC committees should enforce a maximum Ic ceiling of MCLR + 5% (currently approximately 14.5%), consistent with the RBI's 2025 guidelines for priority sector lending to agricultural traders.
- Commission rate transparency: APMC boards should require rate boards to be digitally displayed on the e-NAM platform and physically posted at all auction platforms. Any deviation from the published rate should be subject to mandatory arbitration, reducing the information asymmetry documented in 13% of surveyed buyer responses.
- Integrate climate risk into inventory planning: Given the increasing frequency of unseasonal rainfall in Marathwada (three episodes documented in October–November 2024), APMC risk committees should develop standardised deterioration rate adjustments (θ-adjustments) for use in wet and dry years.

8. Conclusion

This study has presented an updated EOQ inventory model calibrated to the adatiya-mediated trade credit system of Marathwada's APMC markets, incorporating field data through December 2025. By embedding the institutional features of the commission-agent credit relationship into a deteriorating-item EOQ framework, we derived closed-form optimal cycle time and order quantity expressions under two payment timing cases and demonstrated the conditions under which the adatiya's credit extension reduces total inventory cost.

Numerical experiments using 2024–25 survey data from eight APMC markets yield an optimal cycle time of approximately 73.5 days and an order quantity of approximately 273 quintals for the representative case of soyabean trading at the Latur APMC, at an effective purchase price of ₹580 per quintal. Trade credit availability reduces net annual cost by approximately 4.9 per cent relative to the no-credit benchmark. Extending the credit period from 23 to 53 days yields an additional 7.4 per cent cost reduction—the model's single most powerful policy lever.

The sensitivity analysis identifies deterioration rate and holding cost as the most critical parameters, pointing to cold storage investment as the highest-return infrastructure intervention. The commission rate, while politically contentious, has a relatively modest effect (≈1.5% per 0.5 percentage point change) on optimal inventory cost within the observed range. The 2024–25 survey evidence of rising digital payment adoption and nascent formal credit products for APMC traders suggests a promising trajectory toward a hybrid formal-informal credit architecture that preserves the substantive benefits of the adatiya system while improving its transparency and cost efficiency.

Future research directions include: extension of the model to stochastic and seasonal demand environments; incorporation of multi-commodity portfolios typical of large APMC markets; game-theoretic modelling of the adatiya-buyer credit negotiation under the 2017 Act's amended licencing framework; carbon-cost extensions for cold-chain enabled deterioration reduction; and empirical estimation of model parameters using panel data from AGMARKNET and the expanded e-NAM transaction database.

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